Eliminating ditransitives by Kornai, András
Eliminating ditransitives
Andra´s Kornai
Harvard University Institute for Quantitative Social Science
and
Computer and Automation Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
andras@kornai.com
Abstract. We discuss how higher arity verbs such as give or promise
can be treated in an algebraic framework that admits only unary and
binary relations and does not rely on event variables.
Introduction
Until the groundbreaking work of Russell (1900), ideas of semantic represen-
tation centered on the Aristotelian notion that the predicate inheres in (is at-
tributed to) the subject. In modern terminology, this amounts to admitting only
unary relations such as dog(x) or barks(y) and treating binary relations such as
marry(x,y) as the conjunction of unaries marry(x) & marry(y). (For greater
clarity, unaries will be given in typewriter and binaries in small caps font.)
As Russell pointed out, such an analysis will of necessity treat all binary rela-
tions as symmetrical, with intolerable consequences for those relations that are
asymmetrical such as greater than(x,y) or father of(x,y). A Davidsonian
analysis trivially eliminates ditransitives and higher arity verbs, but only at the
price of introducing an event variable, a step of dubious utility for statives like
has. We follow Russell in admitting at least one asymmetric relation, which we
will denote ‘<’, and perhaps a handful of others such as has(x,y) ‘x possesses y’
at(x,y) ‘x is at location y’, cause(x,y), etc.
While we are obviously not disputing Russell’s key observation, we believe
the remedy he proposed was far too radical, throwing out all the linguistic in-
sight that comes with the subject/predicate analysis. In this paper we propose
to retrench, both in terms of drastically reducing the number of available binary
relations and in terms of eliminating ternary and higher order relations entirely.
To illustrate the main ideas in Section 1 we begin with a typical higher arity
verb, promise, which is generally treated as involving at least three, but possibly
as many as five, open slots: an agent, the promissor; a recipient, to whom the
promise is made; the object of the promise; and perhaps an issue date and a
term date as in Alice promised Carol on Monday that she will get her twenty
bucks back before Friday. In Section 2 we present the tectogrammar, which has
its roots in the decomposition technique long familiar from generative semantics
(Lakoff 1968), whereby kill is analyzed as ‘cause to die’ and give as ‘cause to
have’ – we discuss what makes the current model immune to Fodor’s (1970)
critique. In Section 3 we present the formal model using a classic generalization
of finite state automata (FSA) and finite state transducers (FST), machines
(Eilenberg 1974). In the concluding Section 4 we discuss how this approach dif-
fers both from the standard model-theoretic approach and the less standard, but
widely used systems of knowledge representation by semantic networks such as
presented in Quillian (1969), Brachman (1979), or Sowa (2000), which retain a
fundamentally Aristotelian character. We argue that the elimination of ditransi-
tives makes possible a fundamental simplification in the network mechanism in
that we no longer need to deal with hypergraphs where ‘edges’ could be node
sets of arbitrary size – ordinary graphs will suffice.
1 The semantics of promise
What does it mean to make, and keep promises? As Rawls (1955:16) puts it,
“The point of the practice is to abdicate one’s title to act in accordance with
utilitarian and prudential considerations in order that the future may be tied
down and plans coordinated in advance”. Our goal is not to dispute what Rawls
says, indeed we take this to be a perfectly reasonable explanation of why the
social practice of promise keeping is useful, our goal here is simply to explicate all
the hidden implicational background assumed by Rawls and by users of English
in general.
A promise is a commitment to some future action or some state of affairs
that can be brought about by such action. It is assumed that the promissor is
someone who can either perform the action in an agentive fashion, or that the
promise pertains to the actions of someone or something under the control of the
promissor. Thus I will have the car ready by 8AM tomorrow or No, he won’t make
a mess are well-formed promises, while Water boils at 100 degrees centigrade I
promise is dubious usage, and You will win the lottery/I will cure your cancer
are suspect on their face. To make an explicit promise encompasses an implicit
statement by the promissor that they be capable of either performing the action
themselves, or be capable of inducing someone/something to perform it for them.
We will not have much to say about those cases, such as promising the boiling
point of water, that can be paraphrased as ‘I’m informing you’, beyond the
simple observation that this pertains to the knowledge state of the promissor,
and in fact the promissor would be the first to admit this. But we are crucially
interested in cases such as I will cure your cancer or I promise eternal life where
the ability of the promissor to deliver is in grave doubt.
Let X be a predicate of some sort, and let P (A,X, T0, T ) be the statement
‘at time T0 A promises X will hold at time T ’. We need at least a concept of
linear order of time (since I promise you won’t have to wear a scarf tomorrow is
meaningful in a way that I promise you didn’t have to wear a scarf yesterday is
not) and the condition T0 < T . Further, we need a notion of agency that restricts
the overall set of promises to keepable ones, thus distinguishing I promise I will
bring the book tomorrow from I promise I will win the lottery tomorrow. Broadly
speaking, there are actions (or states of affairs – from here on we will just speak of
‘matters’) that are within our power, and there are matters that are not: fetching
a physical object generally falls in the first category, suddenly becoming wealthy
falls in the second. We need a predicate C(A,X, T ) which means ‘agent A can
control matter X at time T ’. Such control can be physical, as in the case of
bringing the book, or purely notional, as in the case of a judge declaring some
contract null and void. It is here that the emptiness of the promise about the
boiling point of water becomes evident: clearly, whatever this boiling point is
(actually, it is 99.97 ◦C at normal atmospheric pressure), there is no person who
can change it.
So far, we have P (A,X, T0, T ) ⇒ C(A,X, T ) where the ⇒ is some sort of
normative implication: U ⇒ V means that if U is reasonable we can reasonably
expect V or, what is the same, if V does not hold U cannot be reasonably
expected. Thus, a reasonable person A will not promise that someone will win
the lottery because we (any reasonable person, A inclusive) don’t expect that A
can control the outcome of the drawing. If A is an employee of the sweepstakes
company the expectations are different, and a (criminal) promise can possibly
be made, but we’d still want to know a great deal more about the causal chain
whereby this control over the drawing (or perhaps over the recording or the
announcement of the results) is exerted. Notice that the test of reasonableness
is not any different for those cases where our default assumption is the presence,
rather than the absence, of control: we assume owners control their dogs and
parents control their babies, yet we remain slightly dubious in regards to promises
such as He won’t make a mess precisely because we don’t necessarily see the
promissor as having the requisite degree of control over the matter.
For control, at minimum we need a matter that can be both ways: unless
we have M(X,T ) and M(¬X,T ) (where M is some possibility operator ‘might’)
there cannot be any controller of X. What does M(X,T ) mean? Certainly X(T ),
the fact that X holds at T , is sufficient to guarantee that X might hold at T ,
but it is either the case that X(T ) or it is the case that ¬X(T ) so knowing
the state of the matter X at T is insufficient – this is well-traveled ground in
modal logic. If the only possible worlds are the states of the actual world at
different time instances, M(X,T ) implies ∃T1X(T1) ∧ ∃T2¬X(T2). If there are
different alternatives with different timelines this becomes more complicated, but
for our purposes we can get by with the simple view and our simple notion of
natural or default implication ⇒. Fortunately, we already have a different time
instance at hand, namely the time T0 when the promise is made. The thesis we
will defend here includes the somewhat radical abductive inference that this is
all that is required: the whole modal apparatus can be dispensed with in favor
of the view that a promise is actually a promise to change, P (A,X, T0, T ) ⇒
(¬X(T0) ∧X(T )).
At first blush, such a view seems to disallow all promises aimed at keeping
some state of affairs intact. Since our goal is to offer a theory of ordinary language
use, ignoring canonical cases of promises, such as marital vows, which are rather
clearly aimed at preserving a certain state of affairs, is not an option, and we
need to discuss how these fit in our model. The key issue, as we shall see, is the
semantics of the modal operator might, which, as we will argue, already carries
this implication of change. Before turning to this, let us simplify the example a
bit. Marital vows are rather complex in that they require the presence of two
agents and have an aspect of mutuality, so to simplify matters we use a promise
of (continued) non-smoking as our example. We claim that the difference be-
tween a promise to quit, This was my last cigarette, where smokes(T0) is to be
followed by ¬ smokes(T) for T > T0, and a promise to stay the course, where
the expectation is the exact same ¬ smokes(T) for T > T0, is a matter of accom-
modation: what is hearer assumes in such cases is that the non-smoking behavior
at T0 (the time of making the promise) was accidental. We make this argument
indirectly: suppose that ¬ smokes(T0) was not accidental, it was already the re-
sult of a promise. But renewal of a promise would be an empty gesture, for either
the original promise was valid, in which case it remains binding for all future
times, or it was not, in which case we cannot reasonably expect the promissor
to upheld the renewed promise in light of non-performance on the earlier one.
Therefore, by the usual quality implicature, we assume that any promissor is a
non-accidental non-smoker for the first time. A general consequence of this line
of argument is that it is pragmatically impossible to re-promise something.
Turning to the modal M we see that ∃T1X(T1)∧∃T2¬X(T2) does not exhaust
the meaning of M(X,T ). First of all, if this were sufficient, from ∃T1X(T1) ∧
∃T2¬X(T2) we could conclude M(X,T ′) with any time T ′, whereas when we say
John might come Tuesday this is certainly not implicationally equivalent with
John might come Wednesday. Rather, might implies both agency and causal
control, so that when John might come this means both that it is within his
power to come and that unless he sets his mind on this it won’t happen. This
logic, being embedded in the lexical definition of the word might, is so strong
that it extends even to cases where our contemporary thinking fails to see causal
control, let alone agency and free will, to be at play. Consider the weather. When
we say The sun might shine what this means is that the Sun, as an agent, can
decide to come out from hiding behind the tree. The reference to the traditional
children’s song “Oh Mister Sun, Sun, Mister Golden Sun” may imply to some
readers that the primitive animistic viewpoint whereby the Sun has the power
to change its behavior is a vestigial remnant of a mode of thought restricted
to kindergarten, yet the Wall Street Journal will use the exact same language
about how stocks may rise or how the market can wipe out the gains it made in
the past two weeks.
So far, we have a unary modal operator M(X) that simply abbreviates the
fact that some matter X might come about, a binary modal operator M(X,T )
that says it might come about at time T , and a ternary operator M(A,X, T )
that says that it might come about at time T by the agency of A. For the
sake of completeness we could also add a binary operator M(A,X) that says
X might happen because of the agency of A but leaves the time unspecified.
The standard approach would be to take the operator with the maximum arity
as basic and define the others as special cases with some of the argument slots
of the basic operator filled by some default value or quantified over. Here we
take the opposite tack, and argue that the basic operator has just one slot, for
the matter X, and that the other slots are inherited from this simply because
‘matters’ in our sense can have agents, times, etc. But before getting into the
details of this mechanism in Section 2, let us summarize what we have so far:
promise is an ordinary verb whose agent X is also assumed, by default, to be
the causal agent who brings about the promised matter X. The object X of the
promise is typically expressed by an infinitival (as in She promised to come), a
future tensed that-clause (as in She promised that she will come) or simply as
some noun phrase or combination of noun phrases (as in She promised complete
immunity in return for a full confession). The time of making the promise, T0 is
in the past relative to the time T that is relevant for the object of the promise,
and from P (A,X, T0, T ) we can conclude (⇒) both C(A,X, T ) and ¬X(T0).
Under the assumptions made here predicate arguments are handled quite
differently from the way one would naively assign the participant roles. In the
case of immunity, we assume the promissor p is in a position to cause some
suspect s to have immunity against prosecution q for some misdeed d, and that
it is s who needs to confess to d. Yet the sentence is perfectly compatible with a
more loose assignment of roles, namely that the actual misdeed was committed
by some kingpin k, and s is merely a witness to this, his greatest supposed
crime being the withholding of evidence. This d′, being an accessory after the
fact, is of course also a misdeed, but the only full-force implication from the
lexical content of immunity is that there is some misdeed m that could trigger
prosecution against which s needs immunity, not that m = d or m = d′. The
hypothesis m = d is merely the most economical one on the part of the hearer
(requiring a minimum amount of matters to keep track of) but one that can be
defeased as soon as new evidence comes to light.
2 The tectogrammar of promise
Our method of analysis relies on unary (intransitive) predicates such as pro-
mise(X), prosecute(Y), commit(Z), misdeed(W), immune(V) and so forth,
and on some lexical implications, expressed in terms of binary (transitive) pred-
icates of what it means to do or have these things. (For now, we retain func-
tion/argument notation with variables to present these, but the formal system
defined in Section 3 will not make use of variables.) Since to the mathematical
logician the temptation to look at these as instances of Currying is almost irre-
sistible, we want to make clear at the outset that in what follows the operation
A(B) ‘apply A to B’ does not imply in any way that some intermediate function
which takes functions as arguments was created. In fact, there is no implication
that A or B are functions, and as we argue in Section 3, it is better to think
of them as algebraic structures of a particular kind, machines (Eilenberg 1974).
Yet somehow, with or without variables, the function-argument structure needs
to be specified, which is precisely the task of tectogrammar (Curry 1961).
In order to deal with the external (subject) argument, we introduce an op-
erator make for which the external argument is obligatory. Taking the nominal
meaning of promise as basic, this means that to promise is derived from this
nominal by application of the (morphologically implicit) make: the expression
s promises X will be analyzed as make(s,promise(X)). The use of implicit op-
erators has a long tradition, going back at least to generative semantics where
the standard analysis of kill was ‘cause to die’. The use of unary operators is
less widespread, and implies a significant departure from the standard mode of
analysis whereby She promised immunity for a confession would be analyzed as
immunity being the object of the promise, and confession as a free adverbial,
outside the subcategorization frame of promise. The unary mode of analysis
forces us assume that there is a single element, immunity for a confession, that
is the object of the promise. What this means is that we must recognize an-
other silent element, one that we will call deal, ‘something for something’, as
an integral part of the analysis. This is confirmed by the communicative ease of
introducing a definite description in a following sentence The deal was rejected.
Further analysis of deal as ‘trade presented by the offeror as advantageous to the
other party’ would be possible, but we do not pursue this here, since the main
idea, that a promise has a single matter as its object, is already clear.
The same analysis is offered in regards to the time parameters, which are
also standardly viewed as free adverbials. It is clear that the making of the
promise has a temporal parameter. All finite verbs have an inflectional slot for
this purpose, so this much is clear irrespective of one’s stance on using an implicit
make operator. This is the parameter we denoted by T0 above. A consequence
of our analysis is that if the object X has a time parameter T this is part of the
promise, rather than being a free adverbial: if ¬X(T ) the promise is considered
unfulfilled.
Again, the same analytic method can be applied to the causation predicate
C(A,X, T ): instead of three direct arguments, we assume that the agent A is the
subject of a head operator make and the object X may, but need not, carry a
temporal parameter of its own. There are many subtle issues concerning temporal
causation, e.g. when by placing a bomb in Bob’s car on Monday Alice causes Bob
to die on Tuesday, but we can largely skirt these as the central issue here is the
promise, rather than the causal control required to keep it. It is worth keeping in
mind that the typical failure mode of promises is not by failure to exert causal
control but rather bad faith or forgetting: in most cases of broken promises the
promissor could have done the right thing but didn’t, out of forgetfulness, or
simply because the promise was not in earnest to begin with.
Finally, the same method works for M : there is a single argument, some
matter X that might come about, but there is no time parameter other than the
one that X may bring in, and for agentless cases there is no agent either. Thus It
might rain is formulated M(rain) and It might not rain is formulated M(¬rain).
Based on the analysis offered so far, these two mean the same. However, if we
consider the agentful cases, such as John might insist on a vegetarian meal,
which is M(John insists) and John might not insist on a vegetarian meal, which
is M(John ¬ insists) the implications are very different: in the first case we better
tell the caterers is reasonable, in the second maybe we don’t have to bother the
caterers is. Notice, however, that these implications concern our future plans not
those of the agent: for the might rain case we better set up a tent is reasonable,
for the might not rain case maybe we don’t have to set up a tent is. What is
really at stake are the plans of the hearer (irrespective of whether the act is by
God or by John) to which we turn now.
In Rawls’ words, promises are means to tie down the future. Simply put,
P (A,X, T0, T ) is kept by X ⇒ X(T ) or, by contraposition, it is reasonable to
infer that the promise was not kept (or no promise was made) if we observe
¬X(T ). By the analysis presented above, both time and agent parameters can
be eliminated from the argument structure: a promise X is kept if X, broken
if ¬X. If Alice promises Carol twenty dollars, and Bob, a mutual friend, gives
it to Carol the next day saying that it came from Alice, Carol will consider
Alice’s promise kept. If Bob just leaves the money on Carol’s desk, Carol will
not particularly know (or care) whether it came directly from Alice or not, she
will likely assume that it did. However, if Carol finds the twenty dollar bill
on the pavement she will not assume that Alice kept her promise. What this
little example shows that the assumption of causation is still very much part
of the meaning of promise. But if P (A,X, T0, T ) ⇒ C(A,X, T ) is now replaced
by P (X) ⇒ C(X), what means do we have to guarantee the identity of the
promissor and the causer?
To answer this question we must invoke the external argument (Roeper 1987,
Sichel 2009). Recall that the object of the promising, the matter X, is a promise
because the promissor A made this promise. How did A make the promise?
Obviously, she was doing things with words, she said I promise. It is evident that
the agent of a performative is the performer, and the way to create a performative
is by saying it. Rather than analyzing s promises X as make(s, promise(X))
we will take into account the specific manner of making and analyze it as say(s,
promise(X)) or better yet, say(s, P) where the object of the saying happens
to be a promise P . Notice that the exact same analysis is available for other
performatives such as deny or name (as in I name this ship Marie Celeste): all
that is required is to have a denial, or a name, as the object of saying.
Saying requires a recipient the same way causation requires an agent. It is
possible that the default recipient is everyone, as in proclaim, or some higher
power, as in swear, and in fact swearing (an oath) is meaningless without the
assumption of such a higher power. But in the cases of central interest, com-
munication between individuals for the purpose of making plans, promises are
made to the hearer by the speaker, and the implication P (X) ⇒ C(X) can be
kept: the maker of the promise, the sayer, is the person held responsible for caus-
ing X to come about. Given our larger commitment to eliminate higher arity
predicates, introducing a ditransitive say(A,O,R) is a step of dubious utility. To
simplify the analysis, we therefore take say to be analogous to give and analyze
it as ‘give words’. By giving a physical object X to R we create a situation where
has(R,X) will be true. By giving our word, we create a promise.
Adding the recipient to the picture, the analysis becomes s promises X to R
meaning s causes R to have s’s word that X or simply cause(R, has(s,word(X)).
It is not necessary for the promise to be addressed to the recipient, in fact a strong
promise may explicitly invoke some higher recipient such as God. The real issue
is how this giving of words, especially to beings whose very existence is doubtful,
can nevertheless facilitate ‘tying down the future’. As Rawls argues, a promise
is a promise to refrain from reevaluating later i.e. to go with the valuation at
the time of the promising. When Alice says on Monday Carol you will get your
twenty bucks back before Friday what this means that on Monday Alice values
highly Carol’s having the money by Friday, and will do things to make this
happen, such as going to the ATM and withdraw cash on Tuesday, or begging
Bob to loan her a twenty on Wednesday so that she can pay Carol back.
Generative semanticists were largely content to use natural language para-
phrases, saying kill means ‘cause to die’. Here we sketched a theory that is only
slightly more formal, saying x kill y means ‘x CAUSE die(y). By introduc-
ing explicit role variables, and typographically encoding the distinction between
unary and binary predicates, the notation is more capable of exposing the tec-
togrammar than reliance on the infinitival to. This actually neutralizes a central
point of Fodor’s (1970) critique of the generative semantics analysis, because
arguments concerning the placement of pronouns are no longer applicable. (As
a matter of fact, subsequent developments in binding theory also rendered this
kind of criticism irrelevant.)
The key reason for using to in the paraphrase was the commitment that
generative semantics had to utilizing phrase-markers (context-free trees) as un-
derlying structures, and the assumption that deep structure is the appropriate
place to fix the lexical category of the words (Lakoff 1968). It is clear from the
foregoing that we are quite content treating promise as entirely neutral between
nominal and verbal, and forming the verbal version by zero affixation of make.
This is one point where the work presented here departs quite strikingly from the
generative semantics tradition, reaching back straight to Pa¯n. ini, who also was
a generative semanticist in the sense of deriving surface form from underlying
meaning, but was also more of a morphologist, deriving both nominal and verbal
forms from the same root.
Fodor’s final argument is based on on the perceived arbitrariness of the de-
composition: why stop at ‘cause to die’, why not go to ‘cause not to live’ or
‘cause not to have life functions’ and so on? This criticism is pertinent not just
to generative semantics, but in fact to any system where the meaning of one
entity is described in terms of other entities. There are two known ways out:
first, designating a fixed set of primitives where decomposition stops. This is
the approach taken both by the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
where a set of about two thousand primitives is used (Boguraev and Briscoe
1989), and by the NSM school (Wierzbicka 1985). The second way out is to use
an algebraic, rather than logic-based, theory of decomposition (Kornai 2010a),
which is immune to the charge of arbitrariness of primitives the same way linear
spaces are independent of the choice of basis we use to present them: the choice
is arbitrary, but one choice is just as good as the other.
3 The formal model
For Russell, whose chief interest was with providing logical foundations for math-
ematics and the sciences, the Aristotelian maxim of Leibniz that predicates are
inherent in their subject was completely untenable, since such an assumption
would make it impossible to handle asymmetric cases like the predicate father.
The differences between Mick fathered Mixon and Mixon fathered Mick are eas-
ily seen in the implications (defaults) associated with the superordinate (parent)
and subordinate (child) slots: the former is assumed to be independent of the
latter (already existed before the act of fathering took place), the latter is as-
sumed to be dependent on the former, the former controls the latter (in the same
everyday sense of control that we used so far, not in the grammatical sense), and
not the other way around, etc.
In our treatment of verbs, it will indeed be necessary to admit at least one
asymmetric relation, which we will denote ‘<’, and perhaps a handful of others
such as has(x,y) ‘x possesses y’ or at(x,y) ‘x is at location y’. At the same time,
we are more parsimonious with relations than Russell, for whom the existence
of a single asymmetrical relation was sufficient reason to open the floodgates
and admit all kinds of relations, and presented a theory in which no ternary
relations are used in the definiens. We illustrated our method of analysis on a
hard case, promise, that is standardly thought to require at least three, and
possibly as many as five, arguments, and argued that at the tectogrammatical
level it has only one argument, the thing that is being promised. All other
arguments are linked in either externally (the promissor, by the matrix verb
make) or recursively, by invoking the frame of the act of promise-making (which
we analyzed as an act of giving words), or the frame of the matter being promised.
To round out this picture what we need is a theory of the representational
objects, one that describes how semantic representations are formed, maintained,
and destroyed (see 3.1) and a theory of bookkeeping that tells us how such objects
can act as slot-fillers in the tectogrammar (see 3.2). (Ideally, we would also want
an account of the phenogrammar, how all these steps are realized on the surface,
but this is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.)
3.1 Representation by machines
Fortunately, a good theory of representational objects is already at hand: these
are the machines of Eilenberg (1974). In brief, a machine is a mapping between
the alphabet of some FSA and the relation monoid of some set X. Eilenberg
intended machines to be an algebraic formulation of the flowcharts widely used
at the time for describing the structure of computer programs – we will use them
to represent the meaning of morphemes, words, phrases, sentences, and texts
alike. The FSA is used as the control of the device just as in Turing Machines,
and the relations are best thought of as transformations of the base set X that
the machine is about.
Definition 1 A machine with an alphabet Σ over a base set X is given by an
input set Y; an output set Z; a relation α : Y → X called the input code; a relation
ω : X → Z called the output code; a finite state automaton 〈S, T, I, F 〉 over Σ
called the control FSA; and a mapping M of each σ ∈ Σ to some φ ∈ Φ ≤ 2X×X .
Since our objects are semantic representations for natural language expres-
sions rather than flowcharts, we need to tweak this definition a bit. As we are
not dealing with the phenogrammar, we can safely ignore the input and output
mappings, which are primarily formal tools for transducing input to, and output
from, the machine. This will simplify the definition, but we also need to compli-
cate it a bit: we need to be more specific about the base set X, whose elements
will be called partitions, and we will need to designate one of these partitions as
the head. One partition (conventionally numbered as the 0th member of the set
X) will contain the phonological form (printname) of the machine, the other(s)
will store information relating to the argument(s).
We will call the machines so defined lexemes, and informally it is best to
think of these as monolingual dictionary entries (see Kornai 2010). One charac-
teristic difference between the model-theoretic and the more cognitively inspired
theories of lexical semantics is the type structure: Montague Grammar relies on
a strict set of intensional and extensional types, with n-ary predicates and re-
lations, while lexical semantics is generally conceived of in network terms, with
only two main types, graph nodes corresponding to lexemes, and graph edges
corresponding to various links, directed or undirected. From the perspective of
strict typing, it is natural to ask how property bundles are composed: for exam-
ple, if properties correspond to qualia, is it simply the case that adjectives are
qualia and nouns are bundles of qualia? From the perspective of the essentially
type-free network theory, the main question is to sort out the kinds of links
permitted by the model (Woods 1975). Here we will try to sketch an answer to
both kinds of questions.
Primitive lexemes come in two subvarieties, unary and binary: the classes
will be denoted by U and B and the instances written in typewriter font and
small caps respectively. Most lexical entries, not just nouns, adjectives, and
intransitive verbs, but also verbs of higher arity (transitives, ditransitives, etc.),
both in predicative and in substantive forms, are viewed as unary, and the binary
category is reserved primarily for adpositions (both pre- and postpositions) and
case markers. With adpositions, it is very hard to see how expressions signifying
pure spatial relations such as under or near could be given a satisfying model
without reference to the pairs of objects standing in the named relation, and
from a grammatical perspective it is quite clear that case markers behave very
similarly (for a modern summary, see Anderson 2006). There are a few stray
examples elsewhere in the system of grammatical formatives, such as the posses-
sive relation, generally not regarded a true case, and the comparative morpheme
-er, but it is clear that on the whole binary lexemes are restricted to a small,
closed subset of function words, while the large, productive classes of content
words are all unary under the analysis offered here.
Definition 2 The surface syntax of lexemes can be summarized in a Context-
Free Grammar (V,Σ,R, S) as follows. The nonterminals V are the start symbol
S; the binary relation symbols B which can include ‘<’, cause, has, ... etc.
taken from some small fixed inventory of deep cases, thematic roles, grammatical
functions, or similarly conceived linkers; and the unary relation symbols collected
in U . Variables ranging over V will be taken from the end of the Latin alphabet,
v, w, x, y, z. The terminals are the grouping brackets ‘[’ and ‘]’, the derivation
history parentheses ‘(’ and ‘)’, and we introduce a special terminating operator ‘;’
to form a terminal v; from any nonterminal v. The rule S → U |B|λ handles the
decision to use unary or binary predicates, or perhaps none at all. The operation
of attribution is captured in the rule schema w → w; [S∗] which produces the
list defining w. (This requires the CFG to be extended in the usual sense that
regular expressions are permitted on the right hand side, so the rule really means
w → w; []|w; [S]|w; [SS]|...) Finally, the operation of predication is handled by
u→ u; (S) for unary, and v → Sv;S for binary nonterminals.
Our interest is both with the terminal yield of the grammar (V,Σ,R, S) and
the sentential forms that still contain nonterminals. The meaning postulates are
specific instances of the attributive rule schema w → w; [S∗] which produces the
list defining w and the predicative schemas u→ u; (S) and v → Sv;S. Whenever
such a postulate is used, the definiendum x is terminated (replaced by the ter-
minal x; and thus no longer available for further rewriting), but the substantive
terms that occur in the definiens are still in nonterminal form. Before draw-
ing many conclusions from the fact that the syntax is defined as context-free
it is worth emphasizing that this is pure syntax. Thus, dog eq four-legged,
animal, hairy, barks, bites, faithful, inferior is a well-formed equa-
tional formula defining the dog, but so is cat eq barks – the syntax is entirely
neutral as to whether this is true or what sense it makes. The standard method
of trying to make sense of such formulas would be to interpret them in model
structures, and failure to do so is generally seen as failure of connecting language
to reality (Lewis 1970, Andrews 2003). Yet, as we have argued elsewhere (Kornai
2010b), such an effort is bound to misfire wherever we encounter language that
is not about reality.
Consider Pappus tried to square the circle/trisect the angle/swallow a melon.
In one case, we see Pappus intently studying the works of Hippocrates, in the
other we see him studying Apollonius, and in the third case we see him in the
vegetable patch desperately looking for an undersized melon in preparation for
the task – clearly the truth conditions are quite different. We may very well
imagine a possible world where throats are wider or melons are smaller, but we
know it for a fact that squaring the circle and trisecting the angle are logically
impossible tasks. Yet to search for a proof, be it positive or negative, is quite
feasible, and the two searches lead us into different directions early on: squaring
the circle begins with the Hippocratic lunes, and culminates in Lindemann’s 1882
proof, while trisecting the angle begins with the Conics of Apollonius and does
not terminate until Wantzel’s 1832 proof. The problem is not with nonexistent
objects such as superwide throats, for which the intensional treatment of opacity
works fine, but also necessarily nonexistent objects whose extension is empty
at every index. (To make matters worse, we rarely know in advance whether
something fails to exist by accident or of necessity.)
In truth, it is not just the existence of hard hyperintensionals that stands
in the way of ever completing the program of model-theoretic semantics – the
failure of this approach is more evident from ordinary sentences than from sub-
tle technical notions concerning hyperintensionals, which may yet get resolved
by work such as Pollard (2008). Consider, for example, the following statement,
(Jonathan Raban, NYRB 04/12/07): There is in Sullivan’s makeup [] an Oxford
debater’s ready access to the rhetoric of condescending scorn. Clearly, this is a
completely meaningful, non-paradoxical sentence, which conveys good informa-
tion about Sullivan to the readers of the New York Review, yet attempts to
analyze it in terms of satisfaction in model structures are fruitless. It is quite
unclear who is, and who isn’t, an Oxford debater, or how we could go about
distinguishing an Oxford from a Harvard debater in terms of the set of people
involved (especially as most debaters are perfectly capable of switching between
the various styles of debate). The same can be asked about every constituent of
the sentence: where is, in a model structure, someone’s makeup, and what kind
of objects r are we sifting through to determine whether r is or is not part of
Sullivan’s makeup? What is scorn, and are Lewis’ (1970) remarks on Markerese
really exemplars of the condescending variety, or are they, perhaps, well reasoned
and not at all scornful?
The semantics that attaches to the lexeme-based representations defined
above by purely syntactic means is of a different kind. We may not have a
full understanding of the relation x has ready access to y, but we do know that
having ready access to something means that the possessor can deploy it swiftly
and with little effort. What the sentence means is simply that Raban has studied
the writings of Sullivan and found him capable of doing so, in fact as capable as
those highly skilled in the style of debate practiced at the Oxford Union where
condescension and scorn are approved, even appreciated, rhetorical tools. It is
basically left to the reader to supply their own understanding of condescension
and scorn, and there is no reason to believe that this understanding is framed
in terms of specifying at every index whether something is condescending or
scornful. Rather, these terms are either primitives, or again defined by meaning
postulates.
A defining characteristic of this network of definitions is that little semantic
distinction can be made between verbs like to promise, to prosecute, to commit,
to (be/make) immune, to *misdo, their substantive forms promising, prosecut-
ing/prosecution, commitment, immunity, *misdoing, and their cognate objects
the promise, the prosecution, the commitment, the misdeed. In this respect, the
underlying type system proposed here is considerably less strict than that of
Lakoff (1968), where deep structure was assumed to be the appropriate place
for fixing the lexical categories of the words. But this kind of loose typing, the
necessity of which is a central claim in Turner (1983, 1985), is quite suitable
for a purely lexical theory, like that of Pa¯n. ini, which can capture the essential
grammatical parallelism between active, passive, and stative constructions (see
Kiparsky 2002:2.2). We also stay close to the Pa¯n. inian model in assuming that
the argument structure, such as it is, is created by the linkers. To illustrate
the mechanism, consider give(x,y,z), which is standardly analyzed as as ‘trans-
ferring possession of y from x to z’. From our perspective, such an analysis is
assuming too much, because when we say The idea gave him the shivers one
cannot reasonably conclude that the shivers were originally in the idea’s posses-
sion, and when we say Mary gave him typhoid, we cannot conclude that Mary
ceased to have typhoid just by giving it to him. Thus we have a simpler analysis,
cause(x,has(z,y)) ‘cause to have’ where cause is used to denote the agentive
linker.
It is worth noting that the formalism offered above does not rely on func-
tion/argument notation and variables at all. To do away with these entirely,
we already fixed the notation: since the binary operators can be written infix,
while unary operators are written prefix, parens are sufficient to fix the location
(though not the identity) of the variables: a formula such as x cause(z has y),
can be reduced to cause(has). The example is only illustrative of the formal
mechanism – this is not the place to recapitulate the subtleties of causation
discussed in Talmy (1988), Jackendoff (1990:72) and elsewhere in the linguistic
literature. By assuming right association most parens can be omitted, only those
signaling left association need be retained to disambiguate application order if
necessary (so far we have not found actual examples). For grouping, braces will
be used, so that the conjunctive feature bundles defining nouns can be kept
together. Such a tight notation does not leave a great deal of room for scope am-
biguities, but as we have argued in some detail elsewhere (Kornai 2010a), this
entails little loss in that universally quantified expressions, outside the technical
language of mathematics, are read generically rather than episodically.
Eliminating variables is a significant step toward bringing the formalism
closer to the network diagram notation familiar from many works in lexical se-
mantics and Knowledge Representation (for a good selection, see Findler 1979,
Brachman and Levesque 1985). We cannot discuss the network aspect of the
theory here in sufficient detail, but we note that in the machine formalism the
proliferation of links, characteristic of many network theories, is kept under strict
control. This is achieved by two means: first, is a links are derived rather than
primitive (see Kornai 2010), and second, by the elimination of ditransitives.
Were we to permit ditransitives and higher arity predicates as primitives, we
would need as many kinds of links as the maximum arity predicate has argu-
ments, and to the extent this number is treated as an unlimited resource (as in
some analyses of serial verbs) we would need to countenance an infinite number
of link types. As it is, we are restricting the theory to only two kinds of links:
those corresponding to substitution of the first argument, and those correspond-
ing to the substitution of the second (as a matter of fact, ergative/absolutive
classification of links would be just as feasible, but we do not pursue this alter-
native here).
3.2 Slot-filling
The only fundamental aspect of the theory not discussed so far is the book-
keeping, how to specify which empty slot in a machine corresponds to which
verbal argument, how to guarantee that no slot gets filled twice, and in case of
obligatory arguments, how to guarantee that the slot does get filled. Recall that
Definition 1 contains two moving parts, an FSA and a base set X, as well as a
mapping from the alphabet of the automaton to the set of relations over X. This,
we claim, is already sufficient for the purposes of tectogrammar. Unaries, by their
very nature, have only one slot to be filled, so linking something there requires
no traffic signals: wherever X is an unary and Y is an arbitrary machine X(Y )
is obtained by placing an instance of Y on the one and only non-phonological
partition of X.
For the binary case, consider Mick fathered Mixon and assume that father is
a relational noun or that to father is a transitive verb. What we wish to obtain
(using infix notation) is Mick father Mixon rather than Mixon father Mick
or Mixon, Mick father or something else. We will ignore the tense marking,
and we will assume a rather sophisticated phenogrammar that has already suc-
ceeded in turning the surface expression into Mick-nom, Mixon-acc, father.
In English, the nominative and accusative linking is provided by word order, in
other languages it may very well be provided by overt case marking. (In fact,
it is slightly wrong to use the terms nominative and accusative in that the two
slots may as well be linked by ergative and absolutive case, but this affects only
the phenogrammar of the language in question, not the mechanism proposed
here.)
It is sufficient for the alphabet of the control automaton of the father ma-
chine to distinguish three elements, those NPs that are nominatively marked,
for which we use the letter n, those accusatively marked, for which we use the
letter a, and all others, denoted by o (see Fig 1). Since to father is transitive, the
control FSA will be a square, with a start state we denote by }, an accepting
state •, and two other states serving as counters for unfilled valences. The lan-
guage accepted by the automaton is the shuﬄe product of exactly one a, exactly
one n, and an arbitrary number of os.
◦
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Figure 1 FSA for transitive verbs
The control is used to define a mini-language that checks the tectogrammatic
conditions: for example for verbs that alternate in transitivity such as eat the
top left state could also be defined accepting, so that Mick ate, unlike *Mick
fathered, would come out as grammatical.
The mapping M is also part of the bookkeeping mechanism. Continuing with
the example of father, let us denote the two partitions 1 and 2. The relations
possible over these include F = {(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2)}; I = {(1, 1), (2, 2)};P =
{(2, 2)} and Q = {(1, 1), } (there are a total of 16 relations over two elements,
but the others need not concern us here). Here we map by M the letter o on
the identity relation I, the letter a on the projection P and the letter n on the
projection Q. As we build up a string, we are also building up a product of
relations, so from starting the full relation F , by the time we multiplied with
exactly one P , one Q, and any number of Is, we arrive at the empty relation.
The mechanism is flexible enough to handle complex relation-changing verbal
affixation rules such as passivization or causativization.
Finally, let us consider how the ‘cause to have’ analysis of give is formalized
using machines. The square FSA of Fig. 1 is replaced by a cube, whose edges are
now labeled n(ominative), d(ative), a(ccusative), and o(ther), though the loops






































Figure 2 FSA for give
Assuming all three arguments are obligatory, there is only one accepting
state, the bottom back right corner of the cube. The base set X has three
members (not counting the phonological partition), which are obtained by sub-
stituting the has machine in the second (subordinate) partition of the cause
machine. In a network diagram, this is depicted as Fig 3 below, with nodes both
for binary and unary machines, and different coloring (straight vs. dotted) of the
edges to make clear which edge originates in the first, and which in the second







Figure 3 Base set for give(x,y,z)
4 Conclusions
Since grammars need to capture tectogrammatical generalizations, some form of
slot-filling mechanism, such as the f -structure of LFG or the subcat mechanism
of HPSG, is clearly needed for dealing with predicate-argument structure. In-
deed, the need is felt so strongly that a variety of linguistic theories such as case
grammar (Anderson 2006), valency theory (Somers 1987) and tagmemics (Pike
1960) posited slot filling as the basic (and in some cases, the only) mechanism
for describing syntactic phenomena.
From a formal standpoint the most immediate mechanism for slot-filling is
to use some kind of variable binding term operators, typically lambdas, as in
λxλyλz give(x, y, z). Once we take this step, the elimination of ditransitives,
and indeed the elimination of transitives, becomes a trivial matter of currying,
and attention is shifted to other aspects of the system: as is well known (Marsh
and Partee 1984), variable binding itself is a formally complex operation, with
attendant difficulties for creating effective parsing/generation/acquisition algo-
rithms.
In the machine formalism propounded here it would actually be possible to
have ditransitives or even higher arity predicates, but only at a computational
cost that increases superexponentially. For technical reasons n-ary predicates
require machines with base set cardinality |X| = n+ 1 (the 0th slot is used for
storing the phonological, morphological, and other position-independent infor-
mation) so the number of distinct binary relations φ is 29 = 512, the number of
ternaries would be 216 = 65, 536, the number of quaternaries 225 = 33, 554, 432
and so on.
Note that the empirical distribution of higher arity verbs drops off rather
sharply: in English we have tens of thousands of intransitive and transitive
verbs, but only a few hundred ditransitives, and only a handful of candidates
for tritrasitive or higher arity. Following Schank (1973), the single most fre-
quent class is physical transfer (PTRANS) verbs such as give, get, bring and
negative PTRANS such us bar, block, keep – altogether less than thirty exam-
ples including portmanteau manner-qualified forms such as throw, toss and mail
where the indirect object is arguably optional. The next most frequent class is
mental transfer (MTRANS) verbs like signal, promise, inform, show followed by
transfer of possession (ATRANS) verbs such as award, bequeath, remit and their
negatives such as begrudge, deny. or refuse. The M and A classes already show
signs of morphological complexity, and in languages that have overt causative or
benefactive morphology the higher arity classes are somewhat larger, but still a
small fraction in terms of token frequency.
This faster than exponential frequency dropoff is hard to grasp from the
variable-binding standpoint, where currying is always available, but makes per-
fect sense from the machine standpoint, where creating (acquiring) and operating
(during parsing and generation) larger machines would require disproportionally
larger resources. In this regard, the current work fits far better with variable-free
(Szabolcsi 1987, Jacobson 1999, Steedman 2001) than with mainstream seman-
tics. However, the fit is far from perfect, in that machines are best thought of
as a means of capturing the structure of meaning postulates, rather than as
a calculus for compositional meaning. Of the two, we actually consider lexical
(non-compositional) structure the higher priority task, given that the primary
information source in a sentence, responsible for over 85% of the information
conveyed, is the choice of the words, rather than the grammatical structure,
which accounts of less than 15% (see Kornai 2010 for how these numbers are
obtained).
Altogether, the theory presented here fits better with the ‘cognitive’ approach
pursued by Jackendoff, Talmy, Langacker, Fauconnier, Lakoff, Wierzbicka, and
many others, and with the whole network tradition of Knowledge Representation
originating with Quillian (1967) and Schank (1973). One issue that has put
the cognitive work on a less than equal footing with the Montague Grammar
tradition was the naive formalism (famously dubbed ‘markerese’ by Lewis 1970),
and part of our goal is to provide a formal apparatus that is capable of restating
the linguistic insights of the cognitive work in a theory that is sufficiently formal
for computer implementation.
Readers familiar with the history of network theories will know that one of
the key implementational issues is the variety of links permitted in the system
(see in particular Woods 1975), and in this regard the elimination of ditransitives
is a key step. In a network graph, every edge from a node x to some node y and
bearing the label l is of necessity an ordered triple (l, a, b) i.e. an information
structure with three slots. A theory that makes the claim that these are not
unanalyzed primitives but can be built from simpler, binary structures enables
reduction of complexity across the whole system. Specifically, we claim that
there are only two kinds of links (depicted by full vs. dotted lines in Fig.3),
corresponding to the superordinate (first) and the subordinate (second) slot of
binary relations. There is no claim that first always means ‘1’ or subject, and
second means ‘2’ or object, the formal theory presented here is quite capable
of handling mismatches such as experiencer subjects. The claim is simply that
there is never a ‘3’ or indirect object on a par with the first two arguments.
To summarize, we have repurposed Eilenberg’s machines as a simple, variable-
free mechanism for decomposing the meaning of higher arity relations and keep-
ing track of the tectogrammar (function-argument structure). This is the hard
case: extending the system to adjectival and adverbial modifiers is trivial and
requires no further machinery (see Kornai 2010). The result is a formalism con-
ducive to the style of grammatical analysis familiar from Pa¯n. ini and from gen-
erative semantics, and capable of encoding the semantic insights developed from
Aristotle to contemporary knowledge representation and cognitive semantics.
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